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The Exercise of Jurisdiction and the Absent Author of Law’s Speech 
 
Although it is not uncommon for a court to consider the question of whether an 
authority (or which authority) may possess ‘jurisdiction’ (over a matter, a space, 
persons, etc.) it is less common for a court to enquire as to what jurisdiction means in 
the first place. This paper considers what we may mean by the idea that ‘jurisdiction’ 
has been exercised, both for the purposes of providing a tool in identifying and 
critically engaging with its performance, but also as a lens through which to consider 
the production of legal authority.  In bringing philosophy of language and literary 
theory to bear on the question, it is proposed that jurisdiction is the 
performance/speaking of law in which the audience/addressee is pre-supposed as 
subject to that law in a process that is productive of legal authority. 
 
Keywords: Jurisdiction; Legal Theory; Speech Act Theory; Performativity; Literary 
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Although it is not uncommon for a court to consider the question of whether an 
authority (or which authority) may possess ‘jurisdiction’ (over a matter, a space, 
persons, etc.) it is less common for a court to enquire as to what jurisdiction means in 
the first place.  In this regard, Al Skeini
1
 was an exception to the norm.  The case 
concerned whether or not Iraqi civilians in occupied Basra had rights under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) against the United 
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Kingdom (UK) in relation to the actions of UK troops. The central legal question was 
whether or not the civilians were within the jurisdiction of the UK at the time the 
alleged offences occurred. If they were then they would possess rights under the 
Convention against the UK as a signatory to the Convention. In the process of 
considering the case, the courts moved from an essentially territorial notion of 
jurisdiction to one that emphasised the relationship between those in a position of 
authority and those subjected to that authority. Thus, rather than considering a dispute 
over whether the UK ought to have jurisdiction, the question concerned whether 
jurisdiction was exercised.  
An instinct to resist ‘recognising’ or ‘acknowledging’ an exercise of 
jurisdiction is understandable where jurisdiction is equated with an (abstract and 
normative) obligation or duty on those subject to it. Certainly those asserting a 
position of legal authority may presuppose precisely this. Where a jurisdictional 
competence is not perceived as justified (whether this be in the context of 
international norms, competing jurisdictional claims, or other normative criteria, for 
example) there is an appeal to rejecting that jurisdiction is in effect at all. This may 
explain, for example, the House of Lord’s embrace of the Secretary of State’s claim in 
Al Skeini that to recognize a jurisdictional relationship between UK troops and Iraqi 
civilians so as to provide them rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 would 
amount to ‘human rights imperialism’.
2
 The irony of the state that is “bountiful with 
military imperialism but bashful of the stigma of human rights imperialism”
3
 brings 
us to the heart of an important distinction: the distinction between the exercise of a 
kind of power and whether we consider that exercise legitimate or right. 
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In its most basic definition the term ‘jurisdiction’ refers to a legal power or 
capacity. But such definitions seldom capture the varied and sometimes opaque ways 
in which a concept occupies our world (nor do they do the work of excavating the 
possibilities and implications of a living concept). In this paper I seek to say 
something about the form and features of this ‘kind of power’, and more specifically 
its exercise in relation to those considered subject to it. Juris-diction 
4
 (law’s speech) 
is theorized here as a legal performance in which the addressee of law’s speech is pre-
supposed as subject to it, and in which the authority of the performance is derived 
from an (absent) authorial force conceived of as ‘law’. When the police hails or a 
judge gives a verdict (for example) they act not just as individuals: These actors who 
give the law its voice defer, or attribute, the source of the ‘force’ of their actions as 
coming from the law and pre-suppose the addressees of that performance as subject to 
it. 
This theorization can be seen as broadly fitting within an academic discourse 
that considers the productive power of legal performances. Unlike critical legal 
scholars such as Daniel Matthews or Costas Douzinas, however, in looking at the way 
in which jurisdiction constitutes (its own) legal authority I focus on the relation 
between the legal performance and law as its authorial source rather than the relation 
between law’s force and narratives of legitimacy (such as reference to a sovereign 
source founding and providing legitimacy to the law).
5
 By focusing the view more 
narrowly on the relationship between the legal performance and law as the author and 
authorizing force of the performance (rather than a mythical constituting ‘we’ for 
example) it provides an alternate (although not mutually exclusive) means of 
considering the production of authority. Importantly, it also provides a mechanism for 
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examining and identifying instances where the exercise of jurisdiction is divorced 
from such narratives – as may be the case in a military occupation.  
Similarly, the theoretical engagement with law as performance has 
commonalities with Elena Loizidou’s work on law and performativity
6
 and Marianne 
Constable’s work on law and speech act theory
7
 – however, there is, again, a marked 
difference in focus. Where both the above scholars emphasise the responsive and 
open nature of law, and in particular the capacity of various ‘performers’ (not just 
those who claim jurisdictional competence) to engage and transform law, the work 
here is instead focused on the relationship between those whose actions are 
considered ‘authored’ and ‘authorised’ by law and those considered addresses of these 
performances and ‘subject to’ law. In other words, the focus concerns those who 
present themselves as possessing the power of law in relation to those who are subject 
to that power in a jurisdictional relationship. 
In the first section of the paper, contemporary engagements with the idea of 
jurisdiction as a productive power is considered so as to situation both the question of 
jurisdiction within the literature as well as what my own contribution brings to this 
conversation. The second section begins the substantive engagement with the question 
of what we mean by ‘jurisdiction’ and how we might identify its exercise. This is 
considered through an examination of how ‘speaking the law’ presupposes the 
subjectivity of the addressee and how this, in turn, is constitutive of legal authority. 
Drawing from John L. Austin’s speech-act theory (with reflection on Louis Althusser 
conception of interpolation), juris-diction is explored with an emphasis on the 
materiality of the primary performative. The third part of the paper considers a further 
dimension to the constitution of authority in the legal performance, this time the 
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relationship between an ‘author’ and a performance.  Looking to literary theory, the 
way in which law is both absent as an authorial source at the same time as providing 
‘authorisation’ for a particular performance that is proposed as constitutive of legal 
authority. Where the second section looks at the presuppositions in relation to the 
addressee of juris-diction, the third section looks at the presuppositions of the 
authorial force of the law. 
 The fourth part of the paper considers the above theoretical investigation in 
relation to Al Skeini to demonstrate the ways in which we might identify the exercise 
of jurisdiction (with a notable absence of associated narratives of legitimacy) but also 
to indicate why the question is important. In practical terms, identifying an exercise of 
jurisdiction in the case significantly expands the United Kingdom’s accountability for 
its actions extra-territorially under a regional human rights treaty (and through the 
HRA, under domestic law). However, considering the nature of the power exercised 
against civilians in Al Skeini this question also draws our attention to the nature of 
authority and the legal form. In considering what it means to exercise jurisdiction we 
examine characteristics of a particular performance of power.  
    
The Question of Jurisdiction  
A rich tradition of theoretical (and ‘critical’) scholarship has emerged in recent years 
that orients itself around the question of what jurisdiction is, how it functions, and 
what this might tell us about the legal form. This work can be described as clustering 
around three key themes. The first carries forward a tradition in critical legal thought 





 the second is the way in which jurisdiction is productive of legal 
authority in a more general sense; and the third is the opportunity an enquiry into 
jurisdiction provides for critical interventions that challenge the nature of that 
authority.  
Within this first category, Richard Ford has considered ways in which space is 
constituted by jurisdictions. He argues that territorial jurisdiction is a foundational 
technology of political liberalism and the modern state, highlighting the ways in 
which “territorial identification encourages particular types of political and personal 
intersubjectivity while discouraging others.”
9
 Shaunnagh Dorsett has similarly taken 
up the question of the jurisdictional mapping of space to argue that the cartographic 
method (graticulation) used in the shift from status-based to territorial-based 
jurisdiction in Australia rendered “indigenous understandings of country 
incommensurable with the legal doctrine of native title.”
10
  This productive capacity 
of jurisdiction is further considered by others in terms of space and bodies,
11
 what 
becomes excluded from the ‘legitimate’ register of jurisdictional reach,
12
 or what is 
enabled juristically through differing categories of legal personality.
13
 Dorsett and 
McVeigh have identified some of this work with an understanding of jurisdiction as 
the exercise of a technology that can be creatively and critically engaged: “An 
exercise in jurisdiction is always an exercise of a technology, or an assemblage of 
devices, that authorises law, and in a general sense institutes a life – or at least a life 
before the law.”
14
  The ‘technical’ interpretation of jurisdiction allows the jurist the 
opportunity to engage ‘creatively within its medium’
15
 and for some scholars provides 
a method of critical scholarship that gets stuck in with the practices of law rather than 
theorising in the abstract. But whether it is a metaphysical enquiry or an immanent 
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one, the critical potential of theorising jurisdiction derives from exposing its 
productive relationship not just to law’s particular categories, subjects and objects, but 
also to law’s authority. 
 In A Power to do Justice, Bradin Cormack explores discourses on common 
law jurisdiction through literature. In looking to the ways in which literature is part of 
the “technical production of the legal order”
16
 Cormack seeks to investigate how legal 
ideology emerges “as the artefact of technical practice”.
17
 Jurisdiction is theorised as 
“an inherent, grounding instability within the configuration of juridical authority” 
where “the literary investigation of juridical normativity fits itself into this instability, 
and this haunting.”
18
 In emphasising the broader question of how ‘jurisdiction’, or the 
expression of a legal power over its subjects, is involved with the production of legal 
norms, Cormack ultimately makes a link with jurisdictional practice and sovereignty: 
[J]urisdiction is the principle, integral to the structure of law, through which 
the law, as an expression of its orders and limits, projects an authority that, 
whatever its origin, needs functionally no other ground. . . [it] cannot be fully 
described within the juridical conception of power it describes.
19
  
By exposing ways in which legal authority is produced through jurisdictional 
discourse, Cormack also seeks to show its contestable nature.
20
 The contestable nature 
of jurisdiction is further considered by Daniel Matthews when he introduces the 
concept of ‘juris-writing’ as a practice (of legal fiction-making) that uses 
jurisdiction’s instability to create opportunities for critical intervention.  For 
Matthews, this instability is discovered by challenging the myths of an originary 
sociability that founds the common law by re-thinking that sociability through Jean 
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Luc Nancy’s ontological concept of ‘being-with’. Unlike an understanding of 
sociability that provides for a stable foundation from which law can be declared, 
‘being-with’ involves an inoperability of community that disrupts the perceived 
stability of such a foundation. As all law involves a process of fiction-making, juris-
writing is conceived as that creative and critical practice that challenges jurisdiction’s 
current fictions for new or alternate ones.  
 In various ways each of the above scholars consider jurisdiction as an activity 
that is productive: productive of categories (of subjects, beings, relationships, spaces, 
etc.) but also productive of legal authority, and it is at the limits of jurisdiction that the 
law reflects on (and asserts) its own powers. When a court considers, for example, 
whether a matter is ‘within its jurisdiction’ (and what characteristics must be 
identified in the process to make this decision) they are contemplating not only the 
appropriate exercise of their power but are also producing a power, the power to 
decide the question in the first place.
21
 Perhaps more fundamentally jurisdiction can 
be thought in terms of the law speaking itself into existence, and for Matthews, this is 




The analysis of jurisdiction offered in this paper affirms the productive power 
of juris-diction as a legal performance, but proposes a particular thesis on the form 
and features of this performance that also involves an account of how this is 
productive of legal authority. Thus, where Cormack, for example, described the 
jurisdictional performance as projecting ‘an authority that, whatever its origin, needs 
functionally no other ground,’ I have sought to both elucidate a theory of how this 




Speaking the Law 
The illocutionary speech act 
In How do to Things with Words, a series of lectures given in 1955 and published as a 
book posthumously, John Austin challenged the idea (popular at the time) that for a 
statement to be meaningful it must be verifiable.
23
 He did this by initially suggesting 
that we might distinguish between statements that are ‘performative’ and statements 
that are ‘constative’. Where constatives are statements of fact that can be described as 
either true or false, performatives are statements that do something rather than 
describe something, an exemplar of which is the statement ‘I promise’. Rather than 
being verifiable, Austin suggests that performatives can be described as either happy 
or unhappy. A happy performative statement would be, for example, one that is 
successful in its utterance as well as made in good faith. An unhappy performative 
may be unsuccessful (i.e. ‘misfires’) or may be unhappy because the person making 
the statement lacks the intention to follow through (which Austin describes as an 
‘abuse’).
24
 A promise made without the intention to follow through (an ‘abuse’) 
would be unhappy according to Austin’s schema, although it would still have been 
successfully achieved – the promise would have been made. 
Ultimately, by the end of the lecture series Austin abandons the strict 
dichotomy between performatives and constatives since ultimately ‘all speaking is to 
act’.
25
 In exploring the originally proposed distinction, however, he suggests new sets 
of categories to describe different ways in which we do things when we speak.
 
 
Firstly, he proposes that we can think of the act of speaking according to three key 
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types. The first is a locutionary act: an act of speech which has both sense and 
reference - that is to say that the speech act is not just comprised of meaningless 
sounds, or sounds which ‘sound like words’ yet have no meaning. The second is an 
illocutionary act: an act of speech that is a locutionary act, but which also has a 
specific kind of force, or, which ‘takes effect’. The final category he proposes is 
perlocutionary acts, precisely those acts that have an effect rather than ‘take effect’.
26
 
The illocutionary act is the kind of action ‘done’ when speaking that is of interest to 
Austin, and, with which he associates the kind of action he had in mind when talking 
about ‘performatives’. Unlike perlocutionary acts which identify those speech acts 
that may result in certain types of consequences (such as upsetting, reassuring, or 
educating someone as a result of the speech act), the ‘taking effect’ of an illocutionary 
act brings about “[T]he understanding of the meaning and force of the locution. So the 
performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake.”
27
 This ‘uptake’ 
indicates the specific social nature of the speech act. It is not ‘just’ a statement, but it 
is a statement with a shared understanding of social implications.  
 
Uptake 
A promise is thus an example of a statement with a shared understanding of social 
implications. Even where a promise is made in bad faith and broken, its illocutionary 
power remains fully intact. In fact the very abuse of the promise indicates the power 
of the force. A promise has been made, and the person who has made it in bad faith 
precisely relies upon the shared understanding of the meaning of the promise despite 
the intention not to follow through. Here, ‘uptake’ has occurred because regardless of 
the actual intention of those involved, or the outcome, a ‘promise’ was made. 
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Austin’s further discussion of uptake, however, indicates that the concept as 
he uses it encompasses much broader phenomena than a meaning provided to certain 
utterances as having a shared understanding of social implications. It is in relation to 
this broader approach that I suggest a departure from Austin’s work by further 
distinguishing between the kinds of social phenomena that he is referring to when he 
describes this ‘uptake’. What I wish to draw out specifically is the way in which 
illocutionary force of legal speech does not have to rely upon the kind of uptake that 
involves the acceptance of a subjective notion of obligation on the part of the 
addressee/hearer which Austin associates with utterances such as ‘commands’. This 
falls under one of the requirements Austin deems necessary for a speech act to have 
illocutionary force, which is that: “There must exist an accepted conventional 
procedure having a certain conventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering 
of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.”
28
 
The act of ordering (in the sense of commanding someone) is instructive of the 
kind of uptake where Austin has presented subjective ‘acceptance’ as required for the 
speech act to have illocutionary force. According to Austin, an order is not just any 
command but is “. . . an order only when the subject of the verb is a ‘commander’ or 
an ‘authority’.”
29
 For the illocutionary act to take effect the authority or power of the 
person to complete those acts must also be accepted. This is not simply a recognition 
of socially established roles and practices for Austin, but involves a subjective 
acceptance of obligation in relation to that power. This is also means that the order 
can be rejected and cease to function as an order if that subjective acceptance is 
missing. This would be the case even where convention or previous acceptance would 
appear to establish the authority of the procedure: 
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[F]or a procedure to be accepted involves more than for it merely to be the 
case that it is in fact generally used, even actually by the persons now 
concerned; and that it must remain in principle open for anyone to reject any 
procedure – or code of procedures – even one that he has already hitherto 
accepted . . . .
30
 
Much like Herbert Hart’s concept of the Rule of Recognition, in which to recognise 
law as being law is to accept it as having a certain kind of obligatory power
31
, it 
appears that the ‘order’ for Austin can only be counted ‘as an order’ if it is accepted 
as such by the recipient. In this case the illocutionary act is more than the 
performance of an utterance in accordance with the relevant conventions that give the 
performance (or action) it is generally accepted meaning as ‘having done something’ 
(in a social sense). Its meaning also incorporates the success of that act in relation to a 
particular type of (individual subjective) response to the performance. And it is this 
characterisation, if applied to legal performances, that I suggest caution is required. I 
would also add a caveat here: Austin’s distinctions and categories in How to do 
Things with Words have a very explorative rather than determinative quality. Austin 
often comments on the imperfection and fluidity of the categories he proposes. 
Precisely in this spirit I would argue that in relation to legal performances the 
illocutionary force is not derived from individual acceptance, but rather a context of a 
shared social understanding of certain types of actions having taken place as a result 
of certain performances.  
Thus, in the process of drawing from Austin’s work to explore what 
jurisdiction as a performance (and a kind of speaking of the law) might involve I 
would want to make a distinction that Austin himself doesn’t in terms of his notion of 
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uptake. For reasons that will be further elucidated as the paper progresses, I want to 
bracket the question of whether that uptake involves an ‘acceptance’ that suggests a 
subjective sense of (normative) obligation to comply, and instead focus on the nature 
of the performance that is understood as ‘doing’ something in a social sense. An 
addressee of a legal command, for example, may not recognise the law as legitimate - 
nor even recognise the command as conforming to their understanding of ‘law’ – but 
within a particular context it may still be understood as a type of illocutionary speech 
act (a ‘legal’ one) that carries with it certain kinds of consequences, regardless of 
whether the addressee accepts an ‘obligation’ in relation to it.   
The example of an arrest is illustrative. An arrestee may have no sense of 
subjective obligation to the law. She
32
 might resist arrest or she might comply to 
avoid the potential violence that could occur as the result of resistance. It is likely that 
she recognises the established social implications of an ‘arrest’ as having been made. 
But regardless of how the individual subjectively experiences the arrest, it would still 
generally make sense to speak of her as having been successfully ‘arrested’ provided 
the correct procedures were followed by law enforcement. This sense derives from 
those whose legal performances are considered authored/authorised by law. Whether 
the arrest is considered successfully made might depend (for example) on whether a 
court judgement considered the arrest to have conformed to the relevant legal 
requirements. Without denying the agency of the hearer of the speech-act or the 
subject of language in their participation (and transformation) of phenomena we 
might generally characterise as legal performances
33
 the idea of juris-diction also 
captures those instances where the acceptance (or any other particular subjective 





In the above section, the illocutionary speech act (associated with specific 
conventions and shared understanding of social implications) was introduced as an 
initial approach to thinking about the ways in which law is spoken or ‘performed’. 
However, it is actually what Austin describes as a ‘primitive’ or ‘primary’ 
performative that I would propose provides greater insight into both what it means to 
exercise jurisdiction and how that exercise is constitutive of legal authority.  
 ‘Go get the wood, George’ would be described by grammaticians as a 
sentence in the imperative mood. This means nothing more than a way of looking at a 
sentence and trying to capture a kind of sense in which it was uttered. In this case, the 
sense, or ‘mood’ is such that we would say someone is telling someone to do 
something, someone is ‘commanding.’ In this assessment, there are no assumptions 
about why George should or should not get the wood. There is no assumption that the 
person making the statement has any particular position or ‘right’ to ‘command’. To 
say the statement is of the imperative mood simply describes something basic about 
the nature of the utterance itself. Austin picks up on this simplicity when he considers 
what he describes as a primary utterance. Unlike an explicit performative such as ‘I 
order you to get the wood,’ Austin introduces the primary performative to 
demonstrate the difficulty in his previous formulation that conventions are essential to 
giving force to a performative. While Austin’s interest in this discussion is to develop 
a way of advancing the position that his original performative/constantive distinction 
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ultimately fails as a dichotomy, it provides a useful point of engagement for the 
presuppositions at work in certain kinds of illocutionary acts.  
The primary performative (which is used interchangeable with the ‘primitive 
performative’ later in How to do things with Words) is described as a necessary 
precursor to the explicit performative in evolutionary terms: 
The explicit performative must be a later development than certain more 
primary utterances, many of which at least are already implicit performatives . 
. . [primary performatives] will not make explicit the precise force of the 
utterance. . . but sophistication and development of social forms and 
procedures will necessitate clarification. But note that this clarification is as 
much a creative act as a discovery or description!
34
  
The explicit performative is the result of a (creative process) that moves from 
statements like ‘Get the wood, George,’ to ‘I order you to get me the wood.’ Of 
course many orders do not preface their command with ‘I order.’ We might even say 
that orders that are not in the least ambiguous are not explicit in the sense that there 
are already established norms (conventions) which communicate the meaning of an 
‘order’ even without the explicit element of stating the nature of the performance as 
part of the illocutionary act.)  The implicit performative, according to Austin, often 
involves some kind of statement of fact (and thus troubles the 
performative/constantive distinction). When Austin discusses how performatives 
imply truth statements, he generally refers to those statements that imply something 
about the intention of the speaker. So to say that ‘the cat sleeps on the mat’ implies 
that the speaker of the statement believes this to be true (this would of course depend 
17 
 
upon the context in which it is spoken.) But, in comparing explicit versus implied 
performatives, I would argue we could take a broader approach to the concept of 
‘implied’ to include presuppositions. 
 Presuppositions are powerful things.
35
 They can introduce into communicative 
practice assumptions (of ‘fact’) that are not made explicit and so are not put forward 
by the speaker as a proposition to be contested. If we consider a primary 
performative, such as ‘get me the wood,’ this could imply a request or a threat - or, 
the utterance might be interpreted as presupposing that the person making the 
statement can expect the recipient to comply leaving the ‘why’ ambiguous. Rather 
than beginning from a notion that the person performing the illocutionary act has the 
authority to do so, the very performance of the act itself appears to presuppose an 
authority that may eventually constitute a relationship where such an authority is 
accepted. A useful example of how this process may work is Luis Althusser’s theory 
of ‘interpellation’.  
In Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, Althusser sought to challenge 
and expand the notion of the State Apparatus (as introduced by Marx and conceived 
of as ‘Repressive’ or coercive) by theorising how ideology functions in the 
reproduction of relations of production through ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ 
(ISAs). Unlike previous theorisations of ideology, Althusser argued that ‘What is 
represented in ideology is . . . not the system of the real relations which govern the 
existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real 
relations in which they live.’
36
 Ideology in this sense concerns our understandings, 
perception, or ‘representation of ourselves in relation to the world’. Althusser further 
argued that this is not just an issue of having certain ideas (about ourselves in relation 
18 
 
to the world) but that ideology has a material form. It has a ‘material reality’ in the 
sense that the individuals in question behave in certain ways and participate in certain 
practices as a result of the function of ideology.
37
  
Ideology functions because the individual understands herself to be a subject 
in the sense that she is the author of her own thoughts and free as the agent of her own 
practices. This is not a representation about the nature of reality, but about an 
individual’s relationship to that reality. Althusser further describes this as material in 
the sense that this self-understanding then informs actions – actions that are ‘inserted 
into material practices’. At the same time, it is these very material practices that shape 
and form the individual as a ‘subject’. Ideology, according to Althusser, is made 
possible by the category of the subject and this, in turn, brings him to his central 
thesis: that ‘Ideology interpolates subjects.’
38
 Famously, Althusser described this 
process of interpellation through the example of the hail of the police: 
I shall then suggest that ideology . . . ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects 
(it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have 
called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of 
the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’ . . 
. 
Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, 
the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-
degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has 
recognized that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him, and that ‘it was really 






The individual in the street is addressed by the officer and is ‘hailed’ in such a way 
that the individual understands herself to be addressed by the hail. In this simple 
process the subject recognises herself as the addressee in a speech act that includes 
significant presuppositions about a power relationship between the addressor and the 
addressee. It is not that the individual chooses to accept the presuppositions in the 
address; they respond by recognising themselves as the addressee and are thus 
‘constituted’ as a certain kind of subject. However, this conceptualisation of the hail is 
not necessarily fully faithful to Althusser’s analysis. Although Althusser describes all 
State Apparatuses as having an ideological component, the police (along with the 
courts and the executive) are theorised as primarily ‘repressive’ in nature. More 
significantly, it suggests a reading of ‘the hail’ that is not focused on Althusser’s own 
primary point about the process of interpellation in which the subject understands 
herself in relation to her own agency.
40
 Rather than the hail of the police (so often 
quoted) it is Althusser’s description of religion that gives us a better sense of what he 
means by this.  
 ‘Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you shall believe’ Althusser 
paraphrases from Pascal. Instead of beginning from beliefs that inform a practice, we 
return to the materiality of practice that constitutes the subjects as endowed with a 
consciousness that has ‘ideas’ in conformity with which she acts. These ideas are 
perceived as ‘freely chosen,’ as are the actions that are practised in conformity with 
them. By considering the effects of the materiality of the way in which law is 
‘spoken’ it not only moves us away from Austin’s notion that for language to have 
illocutionary force means that the recipient of the utterance in question consciously 
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accepts/agrees it: It is not that the legal ‘subject’ must consider herself bound to ‘law’ 
nor even the claim that the address is in fact lawful, but it is to recognise herself as 
addressed by a form of speech which pre-supposes her subjectivity. This marks an 
important difference from the early Anglo-analytic jurisprudence of John Austin
41
 or 
Herbert Hart, for example, in which the experience of law would involve either a 
conscious decision to avoid ‘evil consequences’ (Austin)
42
 or some implicit 
‘acceptance’ that includes an accepted ‘obligatory’ force in law (Hart).
43
 The idea of 
interpellation introduces into the discussion the ways in which the simplest ‘hail’ can 
have force and consequence, and in particular, the way in which relations of power 
might be constituted from them.  
It might be objected that material practices such as prayer, or the hail of the 
police, are examples that involve pre-existing conventions and norms. If this is the 
case than interpolation might be a poor fit for thinking through how primary 
performances may ‘take effect’ . However, the primary performative as considered 
here should not be taken as something that is conceived as outside, or prior to, the 
social world. It is, perhaps, beyond the scope of this paper to fully imagine (or 
propose) examples of the various states of development of norms or conventions (or 
institutions or apparatuses) and how material practices play a role in constituting these 
at different specific stages of their ‘establishment’. Instead I would propose the 
primary performative as a means if thinking about the emergence and development of 
norms or conventions – specifically to highlight the power of presuppositions within 
the speech act (whether that be in relation to the emergence of norms, their on-going 
forms of affirmation, or their transformation).  In considering interpolation in relation 
to the primary performative, I wish to draw upon the way in which interpolation then 
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gives us a lens through which to contemplate the materiality of how pre-suppositions 
in language are performed and how this performance can be constitutive of 
relationships (in this instance the distinction between the addressor and the addressee 
of law). 
However, where interpolation is concerned with (and advances) a specific way 
in which the subject internalises (and thus is constituted) by these material practices, 
it is the form of the legal expression itself (rather than the specifics of how it is 
received) that I want to explore here.  Individuals may receive legal performances in 
different ways. It may be that a subject experiencing the legal address is obedient to 
law and feels this to be freely chosen as a result of what Althusser describes as the 
‘duplicate mirror of ideology’ and (or) she may feel compelled by law (or not) due to 
notions legitimacy or morality. The subject experiencing the legal address might also 
feel compelled (or not) by law because of the very real coercive threats backing the 
legal form (for example). But, whatever the specificity of how the legal address is 
received individually, I would argue that what is common to the way law is spoken 
(as an exercise of juris-diction) is the presupposition that the addressee of law’s 
speech is subject to that law. This presupposition is indicated not by an explicit 
justification (or threat) to give this obligation force in a way that seeks to persuade
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or compel.  Rather, the subjectivity of the addressee is presupposed as a fact by the 
form of the legal performance and thus the ‘authority’ of juris-diction is constituted in 
its very expression. 
  
The Absent Author of Law’s Speech 
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While the primary performative provides a way of thinking about the presuppositions 
involved in the legal address, there is another dimension to the jurisdictional 
relationship that I propose is constitutive of the authority of the legal form. When the 
police hails (a subject/addressee of the law), or when the judge decides a case or 
passes down a sentence, they not only presuppose the power to do so, but the power 
exercised is always derivative from something/somewhere else.  For legal critical 
legal scholars such as Costas Douzinas or Daniel Matthews, this ‘somewhere else’ is 
a mythical referent external to law that provides it with legitimacy.  
Matthews’ reference point is the early common law tradition that looks to 
myths of originary sociability to ‘found’ its authority and to thus speak the law. The 
creative paradox is that those who refer to this fiction as an external referent 
authorising their legal declaration are in fact creating the referent in their activity of 
referring to it. It is this ‘circular logic’ that is central to the way in which jurisdiction 
is thought as productive of legal authority more generally.
45
  
 In The metaphysics of jurisdiction Costas Douzinas also draws attention to the 
‘presupposition’ of a mythical past that is brought into existence through a legal 
declaration and notes a lack of distinction between two types of speakers that are 
invoked in the concept of jurisdiction. In the context of a constitutional moment such 
as an assembly declaring law (as opposed to the application of law) the ‘author’ of 
law is the assembly, yet the fictional narrator (that which provides the inaugural 
moment legitimacy) is ‘God’, ‘humanity’, or ‘the people’, for example. The function 
of jurisdiction, he argues, is to “bring the sovereign to life and give him a voice and 
then, by confusing the person who speaks and the subject who states, to conceal 
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sovereignty by confounding its creative, performative aspect with the declaration of 
the law . . .”
46
  
It is attentiveness to this distinction between author (the particular 
constitutional assembly, for example) and speaker (reference to a non-particular 
source of legal authority such as ‘the people’, for example) that exposes the violence 
of jurisdiction and the opening for critique.
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 Both Matthews and Douzinas emphasise 
a source for authority that is presupposed (and created) in the declaratory moment, 
manifesting as a myth that grounds the authority of law. In drawing attention to the 
paradox of this productive moment it can be unsettled and challenged. I would argue, 
however, that the somewhere else does not have to be a ‘something’ external to law. 
Instead, the derivative sense of the legal performance that is constitutive of authority 
can be far more local (as it were) and indicate the way in which a legal performance 
refers simply to law as its authorial (and authorising) source.  When judges adjudicate 
they do so in relation to those persons and matters over which they are said to have 
jurisdiction. The judge, as a judge, only possesses her authority as a judge so long as 
that authority is an expression of (and in conformity with) law. Similarly, we may say 
a police force ‘has jurisdiction’ in relation to specific spaces, specific legal subjects, 
and certain types of events and actions. This jurisdiction allows them to ‘enforce’ the 
law – to search persons, apprehend suspects, make arrests, and inflict violence. Their 
power is authorised by law in the sense that the form of enforcement is legally 
prescribed, and that which is enforced is the ‘law’.  When police actions are not in 
conformity with the powers prescribed by law, it is said they are acting without 
jurisdiction – beyond or outside of their powers (ultra vires).  And, while a legislature 
creates the law and delineates jurisdictions (such as authorising the enforcement of 
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law), a legislature can also be said to operate as ‘authorised’ by (constitutional) law. 
Or, in some cases, as ‘limited’ by international law when its ability to ‘speak the law’ 
may be curtailed by a lack of recognition that what is being spoken constitutes valid 
law in the context it is being invoked.
48
  
If juris-diction is law’s speech, it is in the sense that it is a performance, an 
act, or some form of expression (including a text), that can be considered as authored 
by law. To say that such expressions are ‘authored by law’ is also to say something 
about their relationship to authority. When the police hails or a judge gives a verdict 
they act not just as individuals. Their actions carry the weight of being expressions of 
law (when exercised within their powers). These actors who give the law its voice 
thus defer, or attribute, the source of the ‘force’ of their actions as coming from the 
law. Even law in textual form involves a reference to an author (the law) that is not 
directly present (the constitutive moment that produces the text must always be 
interpreted through its words).
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  And yet this practice of interpretation is constitutive 
of the law as it is interpreted and applied. What is also significant about this authorial 
relation is that the performer is never also the author. The author is always absent and 
unaccountable. 
 Roland Barthes’ (in)famous text The Death of the Author liberated literary 
theory from its concern for an ‘authentic’ or ‘correct’ interpretation of the text: an 
interpretation which claimed its authenticity by divining the intention of the author. 
The text was perceived as independent of originary intention, something that could be 
read and interpreted in a plurality of ways.
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 The law – as an author – is perhaps the 
example par excellence of the author’s absence. Those who make the law, who iterate 
it even in a performative event such as the passing of an act, are not themselves the 
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‘law’ – they are those who have performed its inception whilst also being constituted 
by law as those with the authority to do so. The text, the record of what was said to be 
law in this moment, is not authored by a legislature so much as the ‘law’ - but there is 
no intention to the law, no consciousness behind the veil, only its words and the 
interpretation of those words: ‘It is language which speaks, not the author.’
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Jacques Derrida in turn argues that from observing the absence of the author 
(as well as intention, presence and even the referent) in relation to a text we can 
derive this same absence from language more generally. In Signature, Event Context, 
Derrida argues that the emphasis Austin placed on the role of context in his theory of 
illocutionary speech acts, along with the idea of an ‘ordinary’ use of language, failed 
to attend to the iterability of language. This iterability, much like that of the iterability 
of the text, meant that an utterance could be repeated such that its ‘original meaning’ 
was lost completely. Rather than signalling a failure of language, the possibility of 
‘citation’ and parasitic (non-‘ordinary’ uses of an utterance such as during a play for 
example) is constitutive of language. The performative speech act, Derrida asserts, is 
itself a citation. Without repeatability there would be no context dependent 
illocutionary speech act to begin with, and this constitutive element of repeatability or 
iterability signals the necessity of a distance between the utterance (or sign) and an 
original intention or meaning: 
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a 
‘coded’ or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in 
order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable in 
some way as a ‘citation’? . . . Given that structure of iteration, the intention 
animating the utterance will never be through and through present to itself and 
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to its content. The iteration structuring it a priori introduces into it a 
dehistence and a cleft [brissure] which are essential.
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This argument opens toward a much broader one about the nature of language and 
communication more generally. In Derrida’s following exchange with John Searle, 
and then later with Hans-Georg Gadamer, the very possibility of communication is 
challenged, or at least communication as Derrida ascribes to these authors: i.e. 
communication understood as transporting the idea (the signified turned sign) from 
one consciousness to the other. Iterability, according to Derrida, captures the way in 
which language is never about pure presence. The distance between the sign and its 
context means that every sign, every utterance, not only persists in absence of this 
context (of intention, of code, and of referent), but that language itself is constituted 
by this iterability: the possibility of grafting the sign and the utterance into new 
contexts.  
As Austin himself was rather silent on such issues, I would argue we can read 
him with Derrida’s insight on the iterability of language. However, I would also argue 
for a further distinction between an absence of authorial presence in literary theory 
that applies to language more generally (reading the performance of law as 
‘language’), and the kind of absence involved in the authorship of jurisdictional 
speech. The signature – the authorial attempt to own a text – may be forged, may be 
copied, may never be attributable to an ‘individual’ as a singular thing or source. (The 
individual in limited inc who signs is never just one.) However we can make certain 
kinds of distinctions between where authorship of the content of a performance is 
attributed to the being-that-performs and where the being-that-performs attributes 
authorship elsewhere. This ‘elsewhere’ in the utterances of those who are performing 
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law is the law. Their performance is an expression of an author that is absent not just 
in the sense of Derrida’s brissure but in the more specific sense where an author is 
imagined, but always imagined elsewhere, and it is this form of distance that is 
productive of legal authority.  
Authority has been described as a type of political power (the power of a 
sovereign to compel its subjects, for example); a power that is exercised by right; a 




 but it is perhaps 
Hannah Arendt’s concept of authority that is closest to the way in which authority is 
considered here. Arendt has argued that authority (as distinct from Tyranny, for 
example) does not refer to political power (potestas) but involves a “force external 
and superior to its own power” and that “it is always this source, this external force 
which transcends the political realm, from which authorities derive their ‘authority’, 
that is their legitimacy, and against which their power can be checked.”
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 Although 
Arendt argues that this concept of authority is something lost in the modern world, her 
emphasis on the implicit hierarchy and the asserted (rather than justified) nature of 
authority is something that this exploration of jurisdiction develops – albeit in relation 
to a different ‘source’ of authority than that identified by Arendt (or Douzinas or 
Matthews). When law is spoken (or performed) the power of that performance is 
derivative in the sense that it is authorised by law. Thus, when the judge exercises her 
jurisdiction in deciding a case, or a police officer exercises her jurisdiction in making 
an arrest, they are ‘performing’ law where the force of their performance is derivative 
as a form of legal expression. Law, the source and authorising force of this 
performance - which does not have the body or voice to perform itself – remains 
absent. In considering jurisdictional competence, the source of authorisation itself is 
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always ‘asserted’ (rather than justified), because jurisdiction precisely is law’s speech 
and performance. In this sense law’s performance (by its actors) is productive of the 
authority of an (absent) author (the law) because the performance is based on the 
presupposition of the authorising force of the law to begin with.  
 
Al Skeini and the Addressees of Law’s Speech 
When Al Skeini was first brought before the domestic courts in the UK the question of 
whether Iraqi civilians killed by UK soldiers could have their deaths investigated 
under section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (and thus article 2 of the ECHR) 
depended on the preliminary question of whether the legislation could be applied at 
all. The crucial issue to be determined was whether, as per article 1 of the 
Convention, the Iraqi civilians killed were ‘within the jurisdiction’ of the contracting 
party (in this case, the UK) when their rights were allegedly breached. The House of 
Lords finally determined that only Baha Mousa, a man who was tortured and then 
killed whilst in detention, was within the jurisdiction of the UK at the time of his 
death. In coming to this decision, the HoL took a view of jurisdiction following a 
problematic precedent of the ECtHR – Banković v United Kingdom (2007) 44 
E.H.R.R. SE5. In Banković, it was determined that what was meant by the exercise of 
jurisdiction for the purposes of article 1 of the Covention was essentially territorial, 
but that there were exceptions either where a member state had ‘effective control of 
an area’, or, where jurisdiction was legitimately exercised according to norms of 
international law. This meant that while Baha Mousa was deemed to have been within 
the jurisdiction of the UK at the time of his death (a military detention unit was 
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considered a proxy for territorial jurisdiction in an exceptional manner much like an 
embassy or consulate), Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali, a 15 year old boy who had been 
detained by UK troops under suspicion of looting, and who was brought to a river 
where he was forced to jump in and subsequently drowned, would not have been. The 
comparison is striking. Due to the special status of a detention unit, UK troops 
carrying out a public security role in Basra during its occupation were ‘exercising 
jurisdiction’ in relation to the death of Baha Mousa, but not in relation to Ahmed 
Jabbar Kareem Ali.  
 When the case reached the ECtHR, however, the reasoning for what 
constituted an ‘exercising jurisdiction’ for the purposes of interpreting article 1 was 
significantly different. A line of previous case law (not easily reconcilable with 
Bankovic) had emphasised a relation of ‘authority and control’ in the finding of 
jurisdiction - and it was upon this basis that the court found that instances of extra-
territorial jurisdiction could be exceptionally exercised whenever “the state through 
its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction”.
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This was a radical departure from the findings of the UK courts and clearly 
demarcated within Strasbourg jurisprudence a broad notion of what the exercise of 
jurisdiction may entail. Significantly, the ‘legitimacy’ of jurisdiction (according to 
internationally recognized norms) was not considered necessary for the finding of its 
exercise. In could, as it did in this instance, involve jurisdiction exercised in the 
capacity of a member state unlawfully occupying another state. Although the 
occupation was unlawful, the form of power being exercised was not the same as 
simple military power in relation to enemy combatants. Rather, in taking on duties of 
public order, there was a relationship in which UK troops exercised ‘authority and 
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control’ over individuals – and it is this relationship in which authority was pre-
supposed that I would argue is the heart of the question of how to identify the exercise 




 Thus, Al Skeini demonstrates an example of state agents exercising jurisdiction 
where that exercise of power is unlikely to be conceived of as ‘legitimate’ according 
to either international norms, or, even, the standard narratives of popular sovereignty. 
It was not necessary to determine if the occupation of Basra by UK forces was ‘legal’ 
in terms of international law, nor whether the troops effectively controlled the area. 
Instead, the question was about the nature of the power performed by UK troops in 
relation to Iraqi civilians. Whether the civilians respected the authority of the troops, 
or the legitimacy of the ‘law’, were ultimately separate questions from the nature of 
the way in which power was being performed. The troops arrested, detained, and 
killed Iraqi civilians as an expression of their (imposed) legal authority and in that 
sense were ‘performing’ jurisdiction. Even when acting ultra vires the very nature of 
the relationship and power exercised was conditioned by their role as a ‘public 
authority’.
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  What Al Skeini also demonstrates is the importance of the question: what 
do we mean by the exercise of jurisdiction? 
UK public authorities have a duty to exercise their powers in conformity with 
human rights provisions. Acknowledging against whom that power and authority is 
being exercised regardless of ‘where’ maintains the UK’s accountability to their legal 
commitments. However, although accountability is both pragmatically and politically 
important in this context, I would argue that Al Skeini also demonstrates another 
reason for why the question is important. Despite the fairly well received distinction 
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between law as it is and law as we think it ought to be
58
 there remains a strong 
temptation to sustain the bonds between narratives of legitimacy and legal authority 
where the former is conceived as necessary for the later. After all, it may be argued, 
law is unlikely to function as ‘law’ without some normative force, or, perhaps some 
form of generalised recognition that there is a duty to obey.
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 Al Skeini, however, 
shows us instances in which legal authority is unlikely to be recognised by its 
addressees (those subject to that legal authority) as compelling obligation in anything 
but a coercive sense. Is this to say that such instances ought not be counted as legal 
authority? I would suggest quite the contrary, what it does is lay bare the legal form.  
 When UK troops detained Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali before forcing him into 
the river, the way in which they would have expressed their power (as agents of an 
occupying state with responsibility for public order) would have been within a system 
of authorisation.  They were not just individuals with guns backed by a coercive threat 
(although they would be this too) their expression of power as agents of the state was 
as ‘authorised’ to execute certain kinds of functions by a legal system. Their address 
to Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali would have pre-supposed as a fact that he was subject 
to that authority - authority given form and expression by their performance. This 
performance, I would suggest, is thus an exercise of juris-diction due to the way in 
which it is authorised (the always absent authorising force being ‘law’) and the 
presupposition in its address that the addressee is subject to that authority. 
Conclusion 
Drawing from a consideration of Austin’s speech-act theory it has been proposed that 
a feature of jurisdiction is the presupposition that the addressee of the jurisdictional 
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performance is subject to the law as performed. Even where the recipient of that 
speech-act (or ‘legal expression’) does not accept the legitimacy of the law, does not 
feel bound by the law, or resists the legal performance (perhaps rejecting the 
performance as expressing ‘law’ altogether), in recognising herself as the addressee of 
the performance that pre-supposes her as a subject to its ‘law’ we may still 
meaningfully refer to something identifiable as an exercise of juris-diction (and, 
indeed, to a productive power of this performance.) In exploring literary theory it was 
further advanced that while the distance between any linguistic iteration and its 
authorial intent could be generally applied to the legal performance, there was a 
distinct sense in which an absence of authorship applied in juris-diction (the speaking 
of the law). Whether it was the judge, the police, or even the bureaucrat, the actors 
who give the law its voice defer, or attribute, the force of their expressions as coming 
from an elsewhere (the law). Not only does the performance presuppose the power of 
law to ‘authorise’ its performance, the authorising force is never present to account 
for itself. This paper thus seeks to respond to the question of what we mean by the 
exercise of jurisdiction by giving an account of the jurisdictional performance that 
allows us to make sense of when it is asserted in a context where markers of 
legitimacy (usually associated with jurisdictional competence, such as popular 
sovereignty) may be lacking – an example of which would be an instance of military 
occupation. This provides a tool in the analysis of jurisdiction with relevance from 
Strasbourg human rights jurisprudence.  It also provides an opportunity to develop our 
understanding of how authority may be constituted through legal performances. 
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